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Abstract  This article analyses and compares the performance of regulators in the fields of finance and sport, especially 
cycling. I hypothesize that the courses of crises or scandals is the best time to study the lessons of regulatory response. First, 
I take into account the differences in both finance and cycling by looking at the nature of the rules and institutions governing 
the field. Second, I estimate the attention effect on new regulation in response to crises or scandals. The interest of the paper 
is in the alignment of incentives to prevent regulatory capture and to ensure accountability and enforceability. The paper 
concludes that the differences hold important lessons that call for the reform of rules and institutions governing finance and 
cycling alike. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the similarities between regulation in 
finance and sport, specifically professional cycling. A 
former professional cyclist Marcel Wüst once said: "In 
cycling, as in sports in general, there will be always doping. 
As in politics and business there will be always bribery." 
This statement demonstrates two far-reaching assertions. 
One is that cheating is common in all social systems, and 
can therefore occur in sports, politics, and business. The 
second claim is that he sees the existence of such fraudulent 
practices as a kind of natural law, implying that nothing will 
ever change. But what role does regulation play to mitigate 
the downsides of this behaviour, particularly in sports and 
finance? 
The disastrous consequences of the global financial crisis 
of 2007 to 2009 resulted in a new debate on regulation. Of 
course, like after all severe crises, politicians strived to 
demonstrate its supremacy during this uncertain time. They 
follow public mistrust to investment banks, which 
supposedly create the crisis through the introduction of new 
products, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and 
credit default swaps (CDS). Banker’s initial suspicious 
behaviour is reinforced after multiple accounts of fraud. A 
prime example is the hedge fund manager Bernard Madoff, 
who had designed a $50bn Ponzi-Game. In the wake of  
the financial and economic crisis governments designed and  
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phased-in new laws and institutions to protect ordinary 
citizens in future. Now, there is the Dood-Frank Act in the 
United States and on the international level there is Basel III. 
Furthermore, there are new instruments such as 
macro-prudential supervision as well as institutions such as 
the Financial Stability Board. But a simple question remains 
unanswered: Why do regulations fail? 
Of course, politics is a part of the game. It is both the 
game setter and the referee. Hence, there is inherently a 
conflict of interests in the politics of regulation. In order to 
understand the regulatory problem in more detail, I intend 
to study and compare the behaviour in both sports and 
finance. This is a promising and novel interdisciplinary 
approach because there are arguably several similarities in 
the regulation in both fields. This is the first paper that 
attempts to study this interdisciplinary notion. 
Currently, there are efforts to establish effective global 
regulation in finance just as there are initiatives to combat 
doping in sports. The recent doping scandals, such as the 
IAAF doping scandal in Russian athletics demonstrate the 
ongoing problem. In both areas, the flaws in the regulatory 
approach are well-known and have devastating 
ramifications. The cycling communities in some countries 
are dying out due to the large amount of doping scandals. 
The call for effective doping regulation and tougher 
penalties together with effective reorganization of 
institutional structures is sometimes too late. The recent 
examples in sports demonstrate the parallels to cheating as 
well as crises in finance. There is no doubt that studying the 
parallels in both sports and finance might contribute to a 
better understanding of the underlying problem. This 
interdisciplinary approach reveals new ideas for tackling 
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potential crises in future. 
Ultimately, I find two profoundly contrasting regulatory 
paradigms in finance and cycling. There are underlying 
differences in both regulatory schemes in respect to the 
dynamics and politics regarding the response to crises or 
scandals. How did regulatory differences evolve side by 
side in such dramatically different directions? 
One possibility reflects on the shift in paradigm for 
government intervention in the economy from Keynesian to 
laissez faire. Regulators and market participants oversaw, 
however, the inherent risk of this shift. Another answer is 
the development under the scholarly leadership of George 
Stigler from the Chicago School of Economics. Stigler and 
his followers believe that government regulation is 
restricted by its own constraints. In fact, they argue that 
regulatory agencies are more likely to be captured by those 
they were intended to regulate in the first place. While these 
movements diverged over the issue of regulation, they were 
extremely influential in finance. They proved less effective 
in other areas, such as the aviation sector. This leads to the 
question: How did they evolve in such different directions? 
Are there parallels between doping regulation in cycling 
and financial regulation in finance? 
To answer these questions, I carry out an institutional and 
regulatory comparison and undertake an econometric 
assessment with unique Google search data. Section 2 
provides a brief literature review together with underlying 
definitions. The structure of regulation in finance and 
cycling is compared in section 3. In addition, I focus on 
international and regulatory bodies in Germany. Germany is 
an excellent case study because the past doping scandals 
had devastating consequences, particularly in professional 
cycling. Germany is also a leading player in global trade 
and finance, making it a worthy candidate for adequate 
comparison in both fields. In section 4, I analyse the 
relevant Google data. The paper addresses the problem 
whether or not regulation is affected by scandals or crises. 
Hence, I estimate and forecast several models in order to 
better understand the effectiveness of certain policy 
response. At the end, I develop policy recommendations 
based on the idea and design of regulation in the aviation 
sector. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
Several experts argue that the flaws of the regulatory 
system prior to crises or scandals are a root cause of the mess 
in the end. In fact, a major flaw in finance is the mere focus 
on microprudential regulation [1,2]. Microprudential 
supervision aims to prevent the failure of individual 
institutions and does not see the system-wide aspects. 
Consequently, to mitigate systemic risks, we need a 
macroprudential approach that recognizes the general 
equilibrium effects, i.e. feedback loops, interdependencies, 
bubbles, and so on [3]. Interestingly, despite the on-going 
regulatory debates in both finance and sports, there is almost 
no comprehensive regulatory theory that identifies the 
optimal degree of regulation [4]. An exception is the 
approach discussed in [5]. He provides a general theory that 
discusses the regulatory trade-off in different fields of 
market environments. Hence, this approach provides insights 
to policy-makers in general. 
The word ‘regulation’ comes from the Latin word regula 
(i.e. straight edge, a guide, scale, usually) and regere (i.e. 
straighten, divert, prevail). Thus, it refers on one hand to the 
process of control. On the other hand, it implies the output of 
an ordered state. However, economists utilize the term 
regulation in a broad context. They include both the 
regulation of the overall economic and social system [6]. For 
instance, the ‘Federal Agency for Civic Education’ 
understands regulation as a ‘direct intervention by the 
government in market operations and an influencing 
behaviour of companies by regulation to achieve specific 
public interest for standing objectives.’ In literature, we 
differentiate between two types of regulation: either 
preventive, designed to mitigate damage in general, or 
protective, designed to mitigate damage in advance. 
The justifications of public interventions are potential 
market failures, such as the monopolistic abuse of power or 
negative externalities [7]. Public regulation is targeting the 
preservation of mutual trust that stabilizes a dynamic market 
in the end. Apart from the government, non-governmental 
institutions take regulatory tasks in a globalized economy, 
such as independent authorities or investor-state dispute 
settlements [4, 8]. For decades, regulatory policy has 
consisted of several stakeholders. There are different 
national and increasingly international, or even global boards. 
Indeed, effective national measures can easily be 
circumvented on an international level, i.e. 
regulatory-arbitrage [9]. Consequently, regulatory measures 
ought to be agreed on and implemented at a global level. A 
further problem is the existence of vested-interest groups in 
the regulatory debate.  
Seminal papers by [10] and [5] demonstrate that specific 
environments require specific regulatory response. This 
finding is in contrast to the previous approach by [11]. The 
literature on bank regulation has a long tradition in finance. 
Therefore, I briefly review this literature in more detail. The 
first and most important finding of a market failure in finance 
is the study by [12]. They argue for deposit insurance and 
provide a solution to bank runs. Another aspect studied in 
literature is solvency regulation. They argue for the need of 
capital buffers [13, 14]. Furthermore, [15] argues that banks 
possess better information regarding their own risks, 
meaning that regulators will never be effective enough to 
regulate a dynamic market. I intend to show that an 
interdisciplinary approach might provide effective answers 
to regulation even in dynamic and complex environments. 
3. Regulatory Framework 
The issue of doping has been a frequent subject for quite 
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some time in sports across all the board. In the next 
subsection, I elaborate the institutional structure of 
anti-doping regulation in cycling. Afterwards, I study bank 
regulation in finance in subsection 3.2. 
3.1. Cycling 
At the top of the global anti-doping campaign is the 
so-called ‘World Anti-Doping Agency’ (WADA). WADA 
is organized as a foundation under Swiss law at the 
Anti-Doping Organization by the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) in 1999. In accordance with article 4 of 
the Foundation's Statute it pursues the objective ‘to promote 
and coordinate the fight against doping in sport in all its 
forms’ [16]. The independent WADA equally receives its 
funding from numerous sports organizations and 
governments. Hence, the organization retains its 
independence since it is not bound by the instructions of 
donors but instead merely committed to their own rule of 
law. 
The activities of WADA include, among other things, the 
dissemination of sport ethics of a doping-free sport, the 
research and development of new testing methods and the 
coordination as well as execution of doping tests’ during 
sporting events and training periods. Furthermore, WADA 
defines new standards for doping tests and approves the 
standards in accredited laboratories [17]. The so-called 
WADA Code was adopted by more than 51 governments 
and associations at the Copenhagen World Conference on 
Anti-Doping on 5 March 2003. Since then, it is the main 
framework to combat doping. However, the enforcement of 
the WADA Code is not part of the treaty. In fact, the 
enforcement still pertains to the sovereignty of national 
organizations. 
In Germany, the WADA Anti-Doping Code was adopted 
in 2004 by the national authority, specifically the ‘National 
Anti-Doping Agency’ (NADA). Apart from the 
harmonization of doping controls, the national adaption of 
the Anti-Doping Code targets a better implementation and 
enforcement of regulatory measures. They even developed 
an independent medical board, in order to manage 
exceptions such as special medication issues for ill 
sportswomen or sportsmen. In addition, the ‘German 
Olympic Sports Confederation’ (DOSB) founded in 2006, 
and the related association implemented new strategies in 
cycling. On the international level there is the ‘Union 
Cycliste Internationale’ (UCI) and at the German level there 
is the ‘German Cycling Federation’ (BDR). All 
organizations have programs to combat doping and 
continuously improve the existing measures [18].  
In regards to the hierarchy of these institutions the BDR 
regulates all matters at the national level. The BDR consists 
of 17 regional cycling associations with more than 2,500 
affiliated clubs. However, the approvals of professional 
cyclists remain in the responsibility of the UCI. Here you 
can already detect the overlap and interaction of national 
and international regulation even in sports. The national 
level has limited responsibility in respect of anti-doping 
standards and control, while the international level has 
imperfect control over national procedures and the 
enforcement of anti-doping laws. The most significant 
drawback however, despite the independence of institutions, 
is the voluntary nature. Most international anti-doping 
procedures are self-designed. There is limited 
accountability of these procedures in respect to public law. 
This is an evident disadvantage in almost all scandals. 
Next, let me describe the so-called doping test procedure. 
The two anti-doping codes of WADA and NADA are 
similar in their content. They have the same list of criminal 
offenses and an open list of prohibited drugs. In this context, 
the two codes reveal the negative definition of the concept 
of doping. In article 1 of NADA, doping is defined ‘as the 
violations to one or more anti-doping rules’. But in general, 
the definition of doping is much broader than the mere 
detection of a performance-enhancing substance in an 
athlete's body. Even the possession and dissemination of 
banned substances, misconduct during sampling, or 
breaches of reporting behaviour will be punished. 
Accordingly, all professional athletes are obliged to 
provide details of their location and training times. In 
addition, special groups of athletes, such as A- (B-) 
professional athletes have to inform the NADA if they stay 
away for longer than 24h (72h) of their common habitual 
residence (article 5.5 NADA). The central idea of the 
doping control process is to have a continuous and 
unpredictable procedure. In general, they distinguish 
between training and competition controls (article 5.1 
NADA). Competition testing is basically the responsibility 
of NADA in Germany. But the procedure is carried out by 
eligible organizers of events. In order to investigate the 
blood sample, the organizers transfer it to NADA. The 
selection of athletes is described in article 5.5 of the NADA 
code. In practice, there is a lottery-like procedure with a 
target selection of athletes according to performance. Each 
doping inspection takes two samples from an athlete. If 
sample A is positive and it is not a dispensation, then a 
procedural defect in the subsequent examination could still 
be detected. Hence, sample B is examined. If sample B is 
positive as well, then measures against the athlete will be 
initiated. In Germany, there are two recognized WADA test 
labs in Kreischa and Cologne.  
However, the doping laboratories face several challenges. 
First of all, there is a rapid evolution of new doping 
substances, in particular, blood doping and newly designed 
gene-doping. Secondly, there is a certain time delay and 
lack of doping analytics in general [17, 19].  
The consequences in regards to doping are clearly 
defined. Usually, the athlete is disqualified and suspended 
from future competitions. Furthermore, past victories, 
achieved via the usage of doping, are renounced from the 
athlete. Even a lifetime ban is possible in the case of a 
second offense. Despite these anti-doping rules in cycling, 
and in sports in general, it is still a recurring problem. In an 
effort to prevent this, in 2015, the German government 
strengthened the anti-doping law significantly. Now athletes 
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and dealers of doping substances even face prison time. 
Although WADA and NADA have pre-emptive procedures, 
such as customized information and education for young 
athletes, it is evident that this toolbox is rather ineffective 
and has thus far not really prevented doping scandals. They 
have also failed to strengthen the self-responsibility and, 
self-esteem that could prevent the tendency of doping [20]. 
3.2. Finance 
The goals of financial regulation are to protect creditors 
against opportunistic behaviour of financial intermediaries 
as well as to stabilize the interconnected financial system. 
To achieve these goals, the public sector has the ability to 
regulate and intervene at various levels. So the financial 
intermediation system is subject to many different 
regulatory rules and bodies. To compare the doping control 
system with financial regulation, I study the structural 
elements of financial regulation next. 
Regarding the measures, I distinguish between preventive 
and protective measures again. Furthermore, in finance I 
differentiate between qualitative and quantitative measures. 
While quantitative rules are based on verifiable rules, 
qualitative regulation consists of general standards, such as 
best practice [19]. 
The overall regulatory structure in finance consists of 
special supervisory bodies at the national, European and 
international level as well as special responsibilities for 
central banks [21]. Depending on the country, the 
responsibility is either delegated to several authorities, such 
as a Banking, Securities and Exchange Commission, etc., or 
a central authority. The latter approach of financial 
supervision is currently on the forefront in several countries. 
Germany implemented a central financial supervisory 
authority on 1 May 2002. The three previous federal 
supervisory authorities for Banking, Insurance and 
Securities trading were merged into the ‘Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht’ (BaFin). Now, the BaFin has 
all responsibilities and exercises financial supervision for 
all operating financial institutions independently according 
to §6 KGW (German Credit Law). The organizational 
autonomy of the BaFin is, however, less pronounced. It 
does not have its own statute and authority without approval 
and permission by the Federal Minister of Finance. In 
addition, from a human resources perspective, the working 
and payment conditions are limited by the law for civil 
servants [20]. 
The German Banking Act contains provisions on 
cooperation between the BaFin and the German central 
bank (Bundesbank). §7 KGW state that the central bank has 
ongoing responsibility over private banks. However, 
decisions about individual banks or the adoption of 
administrative acts is still the sole responsibility of the 
BaFin [20]. In terms of sanctions, the BaFin has the sole 
power. It can withdraw the bank license which happens 
typically in serious cases of mismanagement. 
Along with the ongoing financial globalization, there are 
continuous efforts to cross-border cooperation and 
harmonization of regulatory standards in Europe. A variety 
of European and international organizations have been 
established in recent years [7]. The most important are the, 
European Banking Authority (EBA), the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO), and the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB). However, global rules are not 
binding and thus regulatory-arbitrage still takes place. In 
finance, national authorities still have the main power in all 
regulatory matters. 
4. Do Scandals Change Regulation? 
In this section, I study the relationship of regulation in 
cycling and finance. I use Google search data which is 
available from Google.com. According to [21] Google data 
are the only direct measure of attention today. In other words, 
if you gather a time-series from Google, for instance the 
word ‘Doping’, you get information when and how many 
people have been interested in this word. I gathered 25 
weekly Google time-series from 2004 to 2015. This 
timeframe corresponds to approximately 625 weeks for each 
time-series. The time-series are collected by expressions, 
such as ‘Anti Doping’, ‘EPO’, ‘Lance Armstrong’ or ‘Bank 
Regulation’, ‘Collateralized Debt Obligations’, ‘Basel III’ 
and so on. These terms measure the attention of different 
notions in cycling and finance over time. 
4.1. Method 
In the next step I study the statistical properties as well as 
the model forecast. The question is twofold: i) what explains 
the attention that is directed to ‘Anti Doping’ or ‘Bank 
Regulation’? ii) what changes or enhances regulation in both 
fields: risk factors or scandals? I estimate a simple 
time-series regression model 
    (1) 
where α and β are estimated and ϵ is an independent, 
identical distributed error term. The two independent 
variables Var1 and Var2 explain the dependent variable on 
the left-hand side Y. The variable AR(1) is a first-order 
autoregressive term. In the second step, I use the estimation 
of α and β and implement a dynamic forecasting model 
according to the following equation 
      (2) 
where t is the first observation and Yt-1 is the value of the 
lagged endogenous variable in the period prior to the start of 
the forecast sample. In the end, I compare the real and 
forecasting values. The forecasting horizon is at the end of 
the sample from week 500 to 625. A dynamic forecast 
utilizes both the lagged dependent and the lagged residuals. 
The descriptive statistics reveal some interesting patterns. 
Table 1A and 2A, in the appendix, summarize the 
characteristics of the data. Google data range between the 
value of 0 and 100. A value of 100 denotes the attention peak 
𝑌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑟1 + 𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟2 + 𝐴𝑅 1 + 𝜖 ,                             (1) 
𝑌 𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑟1 + 𝛽 𝑉𝑎𝑟2 + 𝛾  𝑌𝑡−1,                           (2) 
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in the time-series and zero denotes the attention low points 
respectively. The attention levels are simply measured by the 
number of Google searches relative to the search volume of 
the respective variable. 
Of course, more interesting are the correlations across the 
different time-series. I compute the correlation coefficient 
together with a standard t-test (Table 3A and Table 4A in the 
appendix). Most of the time-series are significantly 
correlated either positively or negatively at a 10 percent level. 
For instance, the searches for ‘Blood Doping’ are positively 
correlated with ‘EPO’ or ‘Lance Armstrong’ at a 1 percent 
level. Looking at financial data, correlation numbers are 
even more significant, except one variable: ‘Ponsi Scheme’. 
4.2. Results 
Now, I begin with the econometric assessment. I attempt 
to explain the development of the variable ‘Anti Doping’ in 
cycling and ‘Bank Regulation’ in finance. In cycling I use 
two independent variables: first ‘Blood Doping’. Firstly, I 
study the impact on the attention of ‘Anti Doping’ with 
Google searches of the term ‘Blood Doping’. The correlation 
is 0.24 and positive as well as significant. The second 
variable is ‘Lance Armstrong’. This variable is a measure of 
the greatest doping scandal in cycling ever. Lance 
Armstrong has won the Tour de France 7 times but it turned 
out that he had used doping techniques to obtain this 
unnatural success. The statistical correlation of ‘Anti Doping’ 
and ‘Lance Armstrong’ is almost zero and not significant. 
Table 1 illustrates the results of Model I and Model II. The 
regression reveals two important findings: Both independent 
variables explain the dependent variable ‘Anti Doping’ 
sufficiently and significantly. Second, the adjusted R-square 
and F-test denote a good quality of both models. However, as 
I demonstrate next, the predictive power of Model I and 
Model II are different. 
We will see that the attention of ‘Anti Doping’ is mainly 
driven by scandals as measured by the ‘Lance Armstrong’ 
variable. I forecast the development of the variable ‘Anti 
Doping’ from July 2013 to December 2015. Figure 1 
illustrates the actual value and the forecast for ‘Anti Doping’ 
(blue and red curve). The actual value is much more volatile 
than the model forecast. 
Moreover, I illustrate the confidence bands of two times 
the standard deviations on the up- and downside (green and 
black curve). It is evident that the forecast is not sufficient to 
predict actual Google searches based on Model I. 
Table 1.  Regression, Cycling, 2004-2015 
 
Model I Model II 
Constant 11.67*** 11.13*** 
Blood Doping 0.30*** 0.17** 
Lance Armstrong - 0.20*** 
AR(1) 0.78*** 0.79*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.63 0.63 
S.E. of regression 7.93 7.87 
F-statistic 530.70 361.43 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 
Dependet 'Anti Doping' from 2004 to 2015. Sig. 1% = ***, 5%= **, 
10%= * 
 
In my second forecasting model, I utilize the estimations 
of Model II with the variable ‘Lance Armstrong’. Based on 
Model II the forecast is close to actual searches. Figure 2 
summarizes all findings. You can see that the green curve is 
almost representing the forecast of the variable ‘Anti Doping’ 
(blue curve). Figure 2 summarizes both the forecasting 
performances of Model I and Model II. The forecast based 
on Model II that includes the variable ‘Lance Armstrong’ 
provides a better prediction. Overall, I find that the attention 
about anti-doping is driven by scandals and less by doping 
techniques, such as blood doping or drugs. All other Google 
variables are not significant. 
 
Figure 1.  Forecast Model I 
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Next, I study the same issues for financial regulation 
(Table 2). In Model I, I estimate ‘Bank Regulation’ to the 
variables ‘CDO’ (‘collateralized debt obligations’) and an 
autoregressive term AR(1). The coefficients are significant. 
In Model II, I include the variable ‘Financial Crisis’ that 
may impact the variable ‘Bank Regulation’ over time. This 
variable is a measure for a crisis (scandals respectively) in 
the area of finance. Surprisingly, the estimation reveals that 
this variable is not significant. The model does not gain 
explanatory power. 
This is evidence that financial regulation is not driven by 
crises or scandals as above discovered in the case of cycling. 
Therefore, the forecast of ‘Bank Regulation’ is the same in 
both models (Figure 3). The green and red lines (behind the 
green line) are the same because they are identical. The blue 
curve illustrates the real attention of ‘Bank Regulation’. It is 
evident that the prediction is not close to the blue line. The 
other two lines on the top and bottom denote the confidence 
lines of 2 times standard deviation again. 
Table 2.  Regression, Finance, 2004-2015 
 
Model I Model II 
Constant 18.46*** 18.44*** 
CDO 0.10** 0.10** 
Financial Crisis - 0.002 
AR(1) 0.81*** 0.81*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.70 
F-statistic 713.92 475.18 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 
Dependet 'Bank Regulation' from 2004 to 2015. Sig. 1% = *** , 5% = 
** , 10% =* 
Overall, I find that the regulatory framework is driven by 
scandals in the field of cycling but not in the field of finance. 
It is evident that the regulatory impact on crises is less in 
finance despite disastrous economic consequences. 
 
Figure 2.  Summary of Forecasting Model I and Model II, 2013-2015 
 
Figure 3.  Summary Model I and Model, 2013-2015 
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4.3. Discussion and Recommendations 
Nobel laureates George Akerlof, Robert Shiller and others 
have criticized traditional economics for its failure to 
understand the importance of animal spirits and thus 
regulation in an economy. They argue that economic theory 
has failed to acknowledge that economic crises ‘are mainly 
caused by changing thought patterns’. Similarly, Ken Rogoff 
argues that more transparency is required as it is one of the 
most important roles of markets. However, on the contrary, 
there is a culture of non-transparency particularly in finance. 
I propose that the transparent and global approach in 
aviation regulation is a good benchmark for the future of 
regulation. The major elements of regulation in aviation are: 
i) it is dynamic. Specifically in that, the regulation adjusts 
immediately to new problems and challenges; ii) it is 
independent. Hence, the regulation is fully transparent and 
thus independent from politics and vested interests; and iii) it 
is truly international, i.e. all countries have to follow the 
rules and regulations. Jack Welch called this a culture of 
‘boundarylessness’. I think it is this idea worth implementing 
in regulation. In simple words, one must respect the limits of 
one’s own responsibility while being mindful of the impact 
and need to share across functions and organizations. In fact, 
we have lived through the most dramatic economic event of 
our generation and, while there is some normalcy to this 
economic recovery, the root causes are by no means solved 
entirely. Through the prism of my study, it appears that 
regulation in finance and sports have evolved in two 
different directions. The world of finance is characterized by 
an almost pathological antipathy to regulation while the 
regulation in cycling has transformed after big scandals. The 
approach of change is through trial and error. Moreover, that 
is the key element and driver of regulation in the aviation 
sector. An airplane crash or a technical problem during a 
flight always leads to a rigorous study and finally better rules 
and procedures to avoid this in the future. In aviation 
business, a new engine must first be tested for years before it 
is approved and accepted. This regulatory philosophy is also 
recommendable for new financial products. Overall, the 
regulatory approach in the field of aviation is based on trial 
and error and thus more efficient in a dynamic environment. 
This study illustrates several parallels and differences 
between the regulatory structures of both cycling and finance. 
It begins with the need and justification of regulation in both 
sectors. It is mainly due to market failures. However, in 
cycling as well as in finance the professionals are usually 
ahead of the public regulator. In cycling it is due to 
continuous medical progress and a lag in the testing 
procedures. In financial markets it is similar. Here, we have 
continuous financial innovation. Thus professionals 
distribute potential tail risks to the society. In addition, 
financial products become more and more complex, and thus 
it is hardly possible to detect all risks in advance especially in 
a static rule-based approach as it is today. Indeed, experts 
with knowledge in doping or financial engineering do not get 
caught rather benefit. Although this is a terrifying conclusion, 
it can be changed by effective, and not necessarily new, 
regulation. 
There is anecdotal evidence that existing control 
procedures and incentives are far too weak in sports and 
finance. For instance, effective banking supervision requires 
experts but the BaFin cannot attract experts by regular civil 
service salaries [22]. Another problem is the parallelism of 
regulatory institutions and stakeholders. In the case of 
cycling there are several sports’ federations that have 
overlapping powers and sometimes shared responsibilities. 
This regulatory structure is inefficient. In the end, the 
anti-doping institution neither enforces the law effectively 
nor takes responsibility of effective control. 
Similar conflicts arise in financial markets. The central 
bank partly has contradicting objectives: financial stability 
and price stability. But price-stability may be contrary to 
financial stability which requires lender of last resort policy 
and thus creates moral hazard. In the end, this leads to further 
risk taking and instability in the financial and economic 
system. In this context, a long-standing question pops up: 
how does one control the controllers? The best answer to this 
problem is a look to the regulatory approach in the aviation 
sector again. 
5. Conclusions 
All in all, this paper demonstrates an interdisciplinary 
study of regulatory developments in finance and cycling. 
There is indubitably a need for change. Regulators in both 
systems can learn from each other and the best benchmark is 
probably the dynamic, independent and international 
approach in the aviation sector which is characterized by 
stringent regulation as well as by trial and error. 
It remains an open question whether cross-fertilization of 
regulation is successful and whether politics will implement 
some of the ideas. But the frequency of past crises and 
scandals is motivation for change. This paper raises a host of 
questions that deserve further examination. Do we need a 
greater convergence in global regulatory regimes? Do we 
need a new paradigm for understanding global regulation? 
The innovative and interdisciplinary answer provided in this 
paper is a good vantage point for effective progress and 
further research in future. 
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